By RFA

Authorities in the northern Chinese city of Xian have closed a literary Web site run by a Tibetan, apparently for posting “political” content, the editor said.

The site, known as “The Lamp,” claimed some 800 registered forum users. It was closed July 4 by Internet police in the city, the editor told RFA’s Tibetan service.

“When we called the office where we bought the Web site, they thought perhaps it was due to the detection of political content by the Chinese Internet police,” the editor said, adding that the Chinese service provider was unsure of the reasons for closure.

An official who answered the phone at the state-owned Xian Technology Ltd, a company that sells and distributes Web sites, declined to comment on the case.

The site, which offered a main Web site, weblog, and discussion forum, employed the editor, a technician, and an administrative assistant, the editor said.

One contributor to the site said its closure had distressed the Tibetan community it served.

“The sudden closure of this Web site has disappointed many young Tibetan readers. Many have already expressed their disappointment on another Web site called ‘Tibetan Language.’ Several college students called and informed me how they miss our Web site,” he said.

Another site closed
“Usually the Chinese authorities are very suspicious of Tibetan Web sites. They suspect political activities when we run Web sites in Tibetan. They think that Tibetans inside and outside China use these forums for separatist actions.”

The editor said another Tibetan-language site he edited, “China's Tibetan Residential Education Network,” was closed at the same time.

“The Chinese government issued rules on July 1 requiring …the name of an author [to appear] at the end of each article posted on a Web site. If the Web site contains articles on sensitive topics, the Web site or the author could be fined 4,000-60,000 yuan (U.S. $526-U.S. $7,893),” he said.

“The topics specified were writings on security, unity of the nation, ethnic unrest, writings against the Constitution and … unity of nationalities,” the editor said.

Political debate in China over the registration and disclosure of authors’ real names on content posted in Chinese cyberspace has continued for more than two years.

The country’s Web watchdog, the Internet Society of China, has published a suggested “self-discipline” code encouraging bloggers and online authors to reveal their true names.

But the move has drawn criticism from some of the biggest Internet service providers, who say anonymity is one of the attractions of blogging and forum participation, and who fear losing large numbers of Chinese customers to overseas service providers.

Detentions reported
According to the Paris-based press freedom group Reporters Sans Frontieres (RSF), at least 30 journalists and 50 Internet users are currently detained in China, some of them since the 1980s.

“The government blocks access to thousands of news Web sites. It jams the Chinese-, Tibetan-, and Uyghur-language programs of 10 international radio stations. After focusing on Web sites and chat forums, the authorities are now concentrating on blogs and video-sharing sites,” RSF said in a statement on its Web site.

Chinese Internet users who do not use proxy servers are blocked from searching with keywords considered subversive by the country’s Internet police.

Critics are frequently sentenced to jail terms for “divulging state secrets,” “subversion,” and “defamation.”


Original reporting by RFA’s Tibetan service. Translated and edited by Karma Dorjee. Written for the Web in English by Luisetta Mudie, and edited by Sarah Jackson-Han.



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By Santificarnos.com

A Chinese central government-directed campaign to expel suspected foreign missionaries has been ongoing since February 2007, according to China Aid Association.

China Aid said it has collaborated reports by at least five different mission agencies of over 100 foreigners accused of being involved in illegal religious activities in China have been expelled or deported this year between April and June.

Sources inside the Chinese government confirmed to CAA that the Chinese government launched a massive expulsion campaign of foreign Christians, encoded Typhoon No. 5, in February 2007.

This campaign is believed to be part of the "anti-infiltration" efforts to prevent foreign Christians from engaging in mission activities before the Beijing Olympics next year, CAA said.

Citizens from six countries working in Xinjiang, Beijing and Tibet targeted

Most of those expelled are citizens from the United States, South Korea, Singapore, Canada, Australia, and Israel. They were expelled when they were either working or visiting in Xinjiang, Beijing, Tibet, or Shandong.

According to an American who had been working in Xinjiang for 10 years and wants to remain anonymous because of the sensitivity of the topic, over 60 foreign religious workers were expelled from Xinjiang alone.

Some of the workers had been serving the local people for 15-18 years before they were asked to leave in the past few months. At least 15 Christian couples from the United States and other countries were expelled from Beijing in the month of May. Two American English teachers sent by the English Language Institute/China (ELIC) were expelled from Tibet. ELIC, a California based Christian organization, is the largest English teacher-sending organization to China and has trained thousands of Chinese college and high school students since the 1990s.

On May 31, 2007, one Israeli Jewish Christian and an American were arrested and expelled from Linyi City, Shandong province when they worshiped together with 70 House Church leaders. Only July 1, three American Christians from Indiana were detained in Beijing and then forced to leave China after their US passports were taken away for 3 to 5 days by Chinese security agents, according CAA.

Consulate Protection Rights Violated

According to CAA's private interviews with some of the expelled Americans, the Chinese PSB confiscated their passports for 2-7 days and treated them professionally while they were interrogated. They were not allowed to have access to US Embassy in Beijing, a direct violation of US-China consulate protection agreements. Some will not be allowed to return to China for 5 years.

This is the largest expulsion of foreign missionaries since 1954 when the Chinese Communist government expelled all foreign religious workers after taking power in 1949. The Chinese government refuses to recognize foreign missionary status in China so many missionaries choose to work in the education or business sectors as ways to stay in China.

"Given the significant contribution to the Chinese people made by those expelled foreigners, this campaign is certainly misguided and counter- productive," said Bob Fu, President of CAA. "We call upon the Chinese government to correct this wrong by allowing these selfless good-hearted people of faith back into China."



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Feast of Augustine Zhao Rong and 119 companions

By Santificarnos.com

The Feast Of St. Augustine Zhao Rong and 119 companions, commonly called the 120 martyrs of China, will be celebrated on Jul 9. The feast has been included for the first time in the Ordo for the Singapore Archdiocese although it has been included in the Roman Ordo for five years.

Among the 120 martyrs were 87 Chinese and 33 foreigners. Augustine Zhao Rong was neither the first of the martyrs nor the one highest in the church hierachy among them – there were seven bishops, but none native.

Augustinus Zhao Rong (1746-1815) was placed first on the list because he was the first native priest martyr. A native mandarin of Guizhou, he was baptized a Catholic at the age of 30 and ordained a priest five years later. His desire for baptism came after his service as one of the soldiers who escorted Monsignor Dufresse (another of the 120 martyrs who was later beheaded) from Chengdu to Beijing.

Rome decides who is to be canonized (there are many thousands more who died for the faith in China but have not been canonized) and Rome decides the status of the particular saint in the church. By giving the 120 Chinese martyrs the status of universal memorial celebration, Rome affirms their importance to the universal church and to the church in China.

“I know that you are spiritually united with us, and I am certain that you understand that this is a special moment of grace for the whole church and for the entire Catholic community in China,” Pope John Paul II said to Catholics in China at the canonization ceremony on Oct 1, 2000. He prayed that the new saints would “comfort and sustain” the Catholics in China. “Like them you bravely and generously bear witness to your fidelity to Jesus Christ and to your genuine love of your people,” he said.

China’s First Saints

A group of 120 Chinese and European martyrs spanning three centuries – were canonized by Pope John Paul II at an Oct 1, 2000 ceremony in St. Peter’s Square.

Eighty-six of the martyrs were killed about a hundred years ago in China’s anti-foreign Boxer Rebellion, in which an estimated 30,000 Catholics were killed.

Those canonized range in age from seven to 79. They include 87 Chinese nationals, all lay men and women except for four priests. The other 33 were missionaries from Spain, France, Italy, Belgium and the Netherlands: seven bishops, 18 priests, one religious brother and seven nuns.

Spanish Dominican Father Francesco Fernandez de Capillas, beheaded in 1648 while reciting the Sorrowful Mysteries of the Rosary, is recognized by the church as China’s first martyr.

The other martyrs include:

— Five Spanish missionaries killed in a wave of persecutions in southeast China in the mid-18th century. One was beheaded; the others were suffocated or strangled.

— 26 people killed between 1816 and 1862 in a series of anti-Christian edicts issued by two successive Chinese emperors, including a French priest betrayed by a Chinese Christian for 30 coins and a 57-year-old Chinese man who was executed two days after being baptized.

— 86 Catholics killed in the Boxer Rebellion, including 39 lay Chinese men and 27 lay Chinese women. Among them are two Jesuits killed at a church altar and a Chinese man who protested at his trial that he was a Christian over the attempts of his friends to testify otherwise.

— One Italian Salesian bishop and an Italian Salesian priest killed in 1930 by communist soldiers.

Defending the new saints’ reputation for holiness against accusations by Chinese government representatives that some of them were “evil-doing sinners”, he said the Holy Year was the right time to highlight their “heroic witness”. The Mass, celebrated in St. Peter’s Square featured Chinese singing, readings and incense-bearing processions.

Chinese authorities, who had branded the martyrs as anti-Chinese criminals in the days leading to the Mass, expressed fresh indignation at the canonizations and said the move would seriously damage future dialogue with the Vatican. A Chinese Foreign Ministry statement said some of the martyrs were “evil-doing sinners” who raped, looted and committed unforgivable crimes against the Chinese people.

In his sermon, the pope touched gently upon the political issues, saying the martyrs had lived during complex and difficult periods of Chinese history. Most were killed during the anti-foreigner Boxer Rebellion of 1900. He said the canonization Mass, however, was not the moment to “form judgements on these historical periods; this could and should be done in other circumstances”.

“Today… the church intends only to recognize that these martyrsare an example of courage and integrity for all of us and do honour to the noble Chinese people,” he said.

At an audience with pilgrims the next day, the pope stressed that the canonizations were not an attempt to legitimize the colonial policies of past eras. He said critics who see only errors and limits in the missionaries’ actions were not being objective; but if mistakes were made in the missionary effort, he added, “we ask forgiveness”.

At the canonization Mass, the pope said the foreign missionary martyrs in the group had “sincerely loved China, giving all their energy to the country”. The pontiff also spoke of the deep faith shown by the martyrs in the face of death. He recalled 14-year-old Anna Wang, who before being beheaded declared to her executioners: “The door of heaven is open to everyone.”

He said that 18-year-old Chi Zhuzi, even as he was being skinned alive, cried out: “Every piece of my flesh and every drop of my blood will tell you again that I am a Christian.”

At the end of the Mass, which was broadcast to China by Vatican Radio, the pope told Chinese Catholics that he prayed for them daily, understood their trials and was sure they supported the canonizations. “I know that you are spiritually united with us, and I am certain that you understand that this is a special moment of grace for the whole church and for the entire Catholic community in China,” he said. Pope John Paul prayed that the new saints would “comfort and sustain” the Catholics in China. “Like them you bravely and generously bear witness to your fidelity to Jesus Christ and to your genuine love of your people,” he said.

The pope’s words attempted to bridge the growing rift between the Vatican and China’s communist government over the new saints. In a crescendo of criticism that began in mid-September, Chinese authorities first questioned the motives and timing of the canonizations, then said that most of the martyrs were agents of Western imperialism and deserved their fate.

Those canonized included four priests born in China and seven European bishops. The 120 martyrs ranged in age from seven to 79. Nearly three-fourths of them died in the Boxer Rebellion, during which an estimated 30,000 Catholics were killed. China’s current government has applauded the nationalistic fervour of the 1900 uprising.

China’s Foreign Ministry spokesman, Sun Yuxi, told reporters before the canonization ceremony that most of the martyrs “were executed for violating Chinese law during the invasion of China by imperialists and colonialists”. He said their canonization “distorts truth and history, beatifies imperialism and slanders the peace-loving Chinese people”. Vatican spokesman Joaquin Navarro-Valls said the Vatican was “deeply saddened” by Sun’s remarks, especially by his claim that many of the martyrs were guilty of “enormous crimes”.

“The misdeeds which were committed by colonial powers” cannot be blamed on the martyrs, the Vatican spokesman said. “How is it possible to imagine that the Holy See would canonize persons who have committed ‘enormous crimes’?” he asked. China had earlier objected to the date of the canonizations, which fell on the Oct 1 anniversary of the communist takeover of China, a national holiday in the country. The Vatican called that a coincidence, saying it chose the date traditionally used to honour the church’s missionaries.

In the Catholic Church calendar, Oct 1 is the feast of St. Therese of Lisieux, patron saint of missions. That day was chosen for the canonization because the history of Catholicism in China is intimately linked to missionary work and there are many missioners among the 120 martyrs.

Sentiment among Chinese Catholics over the canonizations appeared sharply divided between the clandestine and the government-backed wings of the church. The Chinese Catholic Patriotic Association and the Bishops’ Conference of the Catholic Church in China issued a statement denouncing the canonization of the 33 foreign missionaries. They also expressed dissatisfaction that the mainland bishops had been left out of the process and said the choice of China’s National Day for the canonization humiliates the Chinese people. Local church celebrations of the canonizations were barred in mainland China amid repeated harsh condemnations by the Chinese government and top Chinese church officials.

Bishops and priests in various Chinese dioceses, who all asked not to be named, said that they had been pressured by the government to avoid speaking publicly about the canonizations. But the Vatican missionary news agency, Fides, reported that 57 bishops of mainland China, representing the government-backed and underground church, had sent a signed petition to the pope requesting the canonizations. Church leaders from Hong Kong and Taiwan defended the canonizations.

In the midst of the controversy, China published revised restrictions on religious activities by foreigners, reiterating a ban on proselytizing by foreigners, prohibiting foreigners from bringing religious items into the country except for personal use, and requiring teachers and speakers at any religious gathering to have prior approval from the central government’s religious affairs office.

This is an edited version of an article published at Singapore's Catholic News

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By Santificarnos.com

China Aid Association is reporting that two House Church leaders were sentenced to one year re-education through labor on June 29 in Shandong Province.

According to the official notification paper sent to family members, the two church leaders have been sent to Re-education through Labor Camp of Jining City of Shandong province to serve their sentence. The paper issued by Re-education through Labor (Lao Jiao) Management Committee of the People's Government of Heze City said pastor ZHANG Geming(erred as ZHANG Gaiming in CAA's previous report) and pastor SUN Qingwen were accused using an evil cult to obstruct the law. Their re-education through labor time starts from June 29, 2007 and ends on June 14, 2008.

According to house church sources, both pastors are evangelical missionaries sent from Henan to Shandong province. They were detained on June 15 along with 4 other local church leaders when they had a worship service together. The 4 local pastors were released on July 1 after being forced to have paid 10000yuan($1300) fine.

Meanwhile, in Shanxi province, two forcibly held church leaders are likely to be sentenced to re-education through labor soon.

Pastor Zhou Jieming and pastor Niu Wenbin have been accused as "suspects of using an evil cult to obstruct of the law" and put in criminal detention since June 10. On June 9, 2007, the two ministers along with 12 other church leaders were detained while they were distributing Bibles in a market place in Jiaocheng county, Shanxi province. 4 of them were eventually released at the same day. 6 more church leaders were released on June 15 from their detention center without any legal paper or explanation from the PSB.

On June 29 one more church leader was detained and sentenced to 10 days administrative detention. According to reliable sources, Ms. GAO Qiuxiang(54- year-old) who is the wife of the senior pastor Zhang Tuanyuan(in hiding) of Jiaocheng House church was detained when she went to the PSB office along with the 6 released leaders seeking official explanation paper.

According to CAA investigators' interviews, five of the female leaders were beaten up and abused by the PSB during their five days detention and interrogation time.

Inquires and concerns can be raised to the following Chinese government officials:

Mr. WU Heping deputy Chief of Staff, Ministry of Public Security +86-10- 66262549
Mr. WANG Lixian, chief of staff, Ministry of Justice +86- 10- 65206706
Mr. HU Keming, Chief Administrative Secretary, State Council +86-10- 63097477
Mr. GUO Wei, Director of Foreign Affairs Department, State Administration on Religious Affairs 86+10- 64095157
Mr. LIU Baoju, Deputy Director, Department of Propaganda of Communist Party Shandong province +86-531-82062258


Translation of Notification Paper by Re-education through Labor (Lao Jiao) Management Committee of the People's Government of Heze City (Shandong province)

(Heze Zi No. 356)
Due to the fact that ZHANG Geming using an evil cult to obstruct the law, this Committee resolves to sentence him one year re-education through labor. (Including the custody time before this decision, the re- education through labor time starts from June 29 2007 and ends on June 14, 2008) ZHANG Geming has been sent to Re-education through Labor Camp of Jining City to serve his sentence.
(Stamp of Re-education through Labor (Lao Jiao) Management Committee of the People's Government of Heze City)
Signature of the sentenced individual: ZHANG Geming
Date: June 29, 2007

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The state power of Beijing's communists and Thimpu's royalists is used to deny freedom to Tibetans and Nepalese under its heel, finds Meenakshi Ganguly of Human Rights Watch.

By Meenakshi Ganguly

The study of history provides rich lessons about the damaging effects of oppression and injustice, particularly egregious human-rights violations. One of the most important is that if legitimate claimants are brutally repressed into silence and desperation, their grievances can be exploited by those who instigate further violence. The result of this mistaken choice of war over peace is that almost everyone involved is drawn into a circle of fear and degradation in a way that leaves them even worse off.

Among the various battles raging around the globe - with cluster-bombs and suicide-bombs, between militants and soldiers, over religion or land - one peaceful struggle is rapidly disappearing from our newspapers, and another, possibly more violent, threatening to make news. Each is nourished by human-rights abuses and hidden by the "happy news" of the state concerned. The tiny mountain kingdom of Bhutan and the enormous state of China share the dubious distinction of representing dominant ethnic and linguistic majorities that would prefer to erase minority cultures.

In Tibet, China is building roads, rails and other infrastructure in an attempt to push people into choosing prosperity over religious and cultural identity. Tens of thousands who fled into exile can still cling to their language, culture and religion, but the millions who remain, after years of arrests and killings, have largely been forced into compromise. Many Tibetans believe they are ignored by the international community because their movement was peaceful.

Bhutan, even as it boasted of its high "gross national happiness", has violated international laws protecting political freedom and those shielding against discrimination based on religion or ethnicity, attempting to create a homogenous culture. When minority ethnic Nepalis complained, Bhutan responded by forcing into exile more than 100,000 of its citizens with impunity. Those that remained were silenced and terrified into submission. But now, Bhutan is witnessing the beginnings of a violent Maoist rebellion, one which has already led to reports of arrest and torture of suspected supporters.

Tibet's hidden fractures
If China were to write the history of Tibet, it would describe a "splittist" monk who tried to dismember the nation and harm a government determined to provide its people with care and opportunity. A few journalists, allowed recently to travel to the region by Chinese authorities, reported a 13 percent annual growth rate, widespread construction, tourism and jobs. They were not encouraged to look at the continued repression of political activists, the arbitrary detention and torture, the fact that even possessing a picture of Tibet's spiritual leader, the Dalai Lama, is regarded as a crime. New housing projects are on display, with claims that government subsidies are encouraging nomadic tribes to gain access to education and health.

By contrast, little has been said about how the Chinese government is forcibly relocating those herders into the housing projects, demanding an end to their traditional livelihoods. Human Rights Watch, in a report published in June 2007 - No One Has the Liberty to Refuse: Tibetan Herders Forcibly Relocated in Gansu, Qinghai, Sichuan and the Tibetan Autonomous Region - found that approximately 700,000 people have been resettled in western China. The economic and social rights of Tibetan herders have been violated as they are forced to slaughter their livestock and move into newly built housing colonies without consultation or compensation.

Stories such as those recorded in the report seldom surface. One herder said: "The government says that if we sell our animals and start businesses like shops and restaurants we would have a happy life and not have to work so hard. In our village at present, about 100 households still have cattle, and 100 have none left. Of those, about fifty opened shops and restaurants, but they don't know how to do good business or how to prepare food very well, so naturally they became poor. The other fifty have no shops, no restaurants, and no cattle." Yet Tibetans, led by the Dalai Lama, have remained staunchly peaceful. The Dalai Lama insists that eventually, truth and right will persevere: what after all, is a few decades in the life of a nation? This is easy enough to say for a man who is believed to be in his fourteenth incarnation; but in Dharamsala, where the Dalai Lama presides over the Tibetan government in exile, restless young men alternate between figuring out a ticket to the west and dreaming of a homeland they insist will be lost unless they fight for it - with bombs and guns. They respect their holy leader and cannot disobey him, but no one pays attention to peaceful protests, they insist.

Bhutan's inner strains
In Bhutan, some young people have probably reached the same unfortunate conclusion. In the early 1990s tens of thousands of Bhutanese citizens were expelled from their home. They were ethnic Nepalis, Hindus unlike the Buddhist Drukpas and culturally distinct; the Bhutanese government believed them to be intruders, and potential troublemakers. The community had grown in numbers and influence, and the Drukpa elite believed that its own privileged position and cultural identity was at risk. Citizenship laws were tightened and in 1989, the king ordered all citizens to observe the traditional Drukpa values, dress and etiquette, even removing the Nepali language from the school curriculum.

This led to growing turbulence, culminating in mass protest demonstrations in late 1990. Instead of addressing the reasons for discontent, the government arrested and exiled a large number of ethnic Nepalis. For almost two decades, the refugees have remained in camps in Nepal. Their demand for repatriation was peaceful, but despite endless rounds of talks with Kathmandu, Bhutan has shown little inclination to let them come home.

Meanwhile, ethnic Nepalis who were allowed to remain in Bhutan face constant discrimination, unable to get government jobs, buy or sell land, find admission in colleges or open a business unless they are cleared by government, a certificate nearly impossible to secure. They have to wear the national dress and speak the Dzongkha language. In a report published in May 2007 on this long-term refugee crisis - Last Hope: The Need for Durable Solutions for Bhutanese Refugees in Nepal and India - Human Rights Watch quoted a man who said, "They don't ask me to leave, but they make me so miserable, I will be forced to leave. I have no identification, so I cannot do anything, go anywhere, get any job." The state will no doubt try to write this ugly chapter out of the history of Bhutan. But that won't make the situation any less volatile. In the refugee camps, an offer of resettlement by the United States and other countries has sparked unrest because to some it means an end to their quest for justice and the eventual goal of return to Bhutan. Refugees who speak in favor of resettlement are being threatened and intimidated; in late May 2007, they were attacked by a mob, one of their leaders beaten, and huts burnt. In the ensuing violence, Nepali police forces shot and killed two of the rioters.

Bhutan's Maoist leader Vikalpa, complaining about the "denationalization" of Bhutanese citizens, told a journalist that there was no option other than to launch a "people's war." "Where there is suppression, there is revolt. Where there is revolt, it explodes the empire of suppression into pieces", he said. Meanwhile, there are reports that a number of people allegedly involved with the Maoists have been arrested and tortured by the Bhutanese government.

China and Bhutan still have a chance to avoid the brutal confrontation their policies of ethnic suppression nurture. But to do so, they must stop propounding the cheerful narrative that writes their troublesome minorities out of the picture of national identity, and instead grant them the respect and rights to which they are entitled.


This article originally appeared on openDemocracy.net under a Creative Commons license. To view the original article, please click here.


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By Father Jeroom Heyndrickx,

The pastoral letter of Pope Benedict XVI to the Catholic Church in China, published on June 30, is remarkable and historic for its content and style.

The pope speaks like a father to the Chinese Catholics and with respect to Chinese authorities, and he puts forward clear principles to both of them.

In carefully chosen words, he expresses his understanding of the sufferings of the "underground community," which refuses to cooperate with the government, but also for the "official community" and for its decision to cooperate.

He expresses some fundamental theological principles asking both communities to reconcile, and he calls on civil authorities to enter into dialogue beyond the misunderstandings of the past.

The letter is remarkable for its content because it gives a clear answer to the burning pastoral questions that have divided the Chinese Church internally for 20 years. Only Rome can clarify the confusing discussions of the past.

I understand the meaning of the pope's letter as follows:

There is only one Chinese Catholic Church and it is faithful to the Holy See. Bishops and priests of both communities may concelebrate, but the pope encourages them first to express among themselves their unity by a profession of faith. For the Church to live underground is not a normal situation. There is at present no longer any reason to keep an underground Church community going in China. The pope, therefore, revokes all privileges that were conferred to China's underground community in the past. Chinese faithful may also take part in the Eucharist of priests of the official Church community.

The pope expresses these pastoral guidelines after he, in the first part of his 26-page text (English version), exposes at length some basic theological principles on the communion of particular Churches with the universal Church, reconciliation, and the need for dialogue and cooperation in charity and truth between Church and state, while giving to God and to Caesar respectively what belongs to each.

The pope promised in January that he would write a letter to the Catholic Church in China. Since then, they awaited this letter impatiently, and so did civil authorities. There was even some tension. All planned ordinations and other important Church activities were postponed "until after the letter of the pope," even if it was not said in just those words.

The causes of this uncertainty in China were calls expressed outside the mainland for confrontation with Chinese authorities, as well as last year's illicit episcopal ordinations in China at which Chinese bishops recognized by Rome had been forced to participate.

Everybody wondered: will the pope's letter threaten to apply canonical sanctions for illicit ordinations that may happen in the future? Or will the letter instead be a friendly though urgent call for unity and dialogue?

The large majority of Catholics in remote places in China's countryside had other concerns. The vital question for them has existed for decades: yes or no, may we participate in the Eucharistic celebration of the "open" (official) Church communities? Do we commit a mortal sin if we do, as we were taught?

So much confusion has been caused by what was said, preached and written about these questions that only the highest Church authority could give a clear answer. This is what happened in the pastoral letter. The pope says there: only one Catholic Church exists in China. Let Chinese Catholics peacefully celebrate the Eucharist together.

But there is more in the letter. The pope admonishes the official bishops appointed by the Holy See to make their appointment public. They apparently did not make that sufficiently clear in the past. The pope does not speak a warning language to bishops ordained without papal appointment, but he does ask them to clarify their relation to Successor of Peter now. Underground bishops are encouraged to apply for recognition by civil authorities.

An underground Church "is not a normal feature of the Church's life" for the Catholic Church, says the pope. All bishops should now unite so that Rome can finally recognize officially the already existing Chinese Bishops' Conference. This could not be done until now because the underground bishops are not members, while some other members of the conference are not appointed by Rome.

The pastoral letter touches here upon an extremely delicate point related to Church-state relations. It suggests that the present statutes of the Chinese Bishops' Conference still need to be amended.

In the present situation, one entity "desired by the State" -- apparently referring to the Patriotic Association -- stands above the bishops and makes important pastoral decisions, some even related to the appointment of bishops. Doing so, it in fact directs the Church. This situation takes the pastoral authority away from the bishops, which is against Catholic teaching: "Only a legitimate Episcopal Conference can formulate pastoral guidelines, valid for the entire Catholic community of the country concerned."

The pastoral letter contains more concrete pastoral guidelines than many of us may have anticipated. But they are all important, useful guidelines urgently needed in the Chinese local Church and they are included in Canon Law.

Priests are reminded that they should be incardinated in one clearly defined diocese. Dioceses that have a limited number of priests and experience difficulty in finding a suitable candidate-bishop are encouraged to ask neighboring bishops to help find alternative candidates. Bishops are reminded to set up structures required in their dioceses to promote cooperation and dialogue in pastoral work, such as: diocesan curia, presbyteral council, college of consultors, diocesan pastoral council and financial commission.

The letter even refers to the importance of registering Church properties in the name of the Church, not of individuals. It all shows how well the Holy See is informed about and concerned with the concrete needs of the Church in China.

The pope pleads for the principle of separation between Church and state, a relation in charity and truth to be realized through open dialogue. However, he introduces some points that, from the side of the Church, are not discussable.

The proposal to set up a Church independent from the Holy See is incompatible with Catholic doctrine. The principle that bishops must be appointed by the successor of Peter is crucial for the Church, since only appointments by the pope assure the unity of the Church and the apostolic succession of bishops. These appointments have no political character at all. The pope refers to internationally accepted documents that state the appointment of Catholic bishops by the pope is part of true freedom of religion.

For some readers, the letter may create the impression of being "too clear" and "too explicit," leaving nothing to be discussed and clarified in the dialogue with diplomats. This is the opinion of some friends in China who stress that in China one should leave some things to be cleared up by private bargaining. But here, too, the problem is that years of discussion have created confusion around matters of principle that are crucial for the Church.

Just as pastoral guidelines were urgently needed for the Chinese Church, so too is there need to make clear what is and is not discussable with regard to relations of the Church with the state.

Some people would have criticized the pope if he did not clarify these points. But he repeatedly expresses his hope and trust that, through dialogue, all these questions can be clarified and agreed upon.

As a concrete example, the pope cites the new division of dioceses that civil authorities introduced over the past 50 years but never previously agreed upon with Rome. The pope says this can be discussed whenever opportune and helpful.

This is the beginning of a new phase in the history of the Chinese Catholic Church. Together with the letter in which Pope John Paul II offered excuses for what happened in the 19th century, this pastoral letter is undoubtedly the most important and historical document ever written by Rome to the Chinese Church.

The key words are: reconciliation, unity and dialogue. Nowhere in this letter does the pope call for confrontation. Marked by reconciliation and unity inside the Church and dialogue with civil authorities on the basis of equality and mutual respect, it initiates a new phase in Chinese Catholic Church history.


Father Jeroom Heyndrickx is a member of the Congregation of the Immaculate Heart of Mary and director of Ferdinand Verbiest Institute at Catholic University of Leuven in Belgium.


UCAN

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A Catholic priest in his 30s, who asks to be identified as "a Priest from the Underground Church," has written his impressions of the letter Pope Benedict XVI recently issued for Catholics in mainland China.

The writer in northern China was trained in underground seminaries in China and has studied abroad. He asked not to be named in the commentary he wrote for UCA News on July 2, two days after the pope's letter was published.

The priest analyzes the situation and expresses thanks for the papal letter. He supports the pope's call for unity and reconciliation among all Catholics in China, and draws special attention to the vexing issue of clergy from open and underground Catholic communities concelebrating the Eucharist.

For the priest, the papal letter's only disappointment is that it fails to mention a single word about the clergy who continue to suffer in prison.

UCA News has translated the original Chinese text as follows:



First impressions about "Letter of the Holy Father Pope Benedict XVI to the Bishops, Priests, Consecrated persons and Lay Faithful of the Catholic Church in the People's Republic of China"


The long awaited papal letter has finally been released. The pope's letter touches on various aspects of Church life in China. It cannot be simply summarized in a few articles of reflection, nor can its impact on the Church in China be explained in a few commentaries. This letter undoubtedly will have a decisive impact on the future development of the Church in China. Now, I would like to express some of my personal feelings and views.

1. All through the letter, the pastor of the Universal Church and the successor of Saint Peter expresses concern for the faithful in China. He is willing to share the joy and hope, worries and anxieties of the Church there. This will bring about much spiritual happiness to the Chinese Catholics. We can feel we are an important part of the Universal Church. We can feel his pastoral care and deeply feel that communion of the Church is not an empty concept. We know that we actually live in the communion of the Church.

2. For more than 50 years, the Church in China could not experience normal development. Therefore, the pope in this letter hopes to see the Church in China, in the process of overcoming many difficulties, slowly moving toward normal and full development. Whether in revoking the faculties or in teaching various sectors among the faithful (bishops, priests, families), he expresses concern about the urgent problems the Church in China faces and points out how the Church can move toward healthy and normal development.

3. The most urgent mission of the Church in China is now reconciliation. Reconciliation means we look to Jesus Christ together in truth and charity. Such adoration and focus demand that we abandon past prejudices so as to sit down and engage in true dialogue. If the Church is like a real person and we are to live together in communion with Christ, then the present situation in the Church in China can and must be altered first by you and me. We have to sit down and listen to one another. In communion with Christ, we must accept one another. We actually are one body. Our quarrels and confrontation are definitely not what Christ wants. We need to sit down in love and truth -- even better, in the truth of love and in the love of truth -- so that we can pursue sincere dialogue. We should not look at each other's attitude. I must first sit down unconditionally. To have the other sit down, I first must sit down. The only way to have the other listen to me is for me first to listen to the other. The only way to avoid quarrel is for me not to quarrel. Of course, I do this not to make the other sit down but because he and I are in communion with Christ and we live in the same Church of Christ. In such dialogue of unity, it is equally dreadful to forget about love and to forget about truth. The pope has reiterated the truth of the Church in this letter. At the same time, he points out the concrete demand of love. To brothers in communion with the pope and the bishops' conferences of the Universal Church, I should open my heart completely. This carries us to the question of "concelebration." Perhaps some members of the "underground" Church will find this hard to accept for the present. We should put aside personal prejudices and personal views and bear in mind the Church of Christ.

4. Regarding the legal aspect and actual reality, objectively speaking, it is clear that religious freedom (including freedom of belief and freedom of movement) promulgated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is not yet fully observed in China. As a priest in the "unofficial" Church, I personally believe the reason for our existence is to uphold human beings' vocation and continuous struggle for the fundamental rights of religious freedom. Different voices should be allowed and even encouraged within the Church. Diversity will only enrich Church life. The true value of the "underground" Church's existence is the weak but real voice it utters. It is the voice of human conscience. While not denying the government's efforts to achieve religious freedom in the past 30 years, we have to admit that China still has a long way to go to achieve the generally accepted international standard.

5. As part of its normal development, a religious community will definitely relate to the local government directly or indirectly. Normal Church life cannot lack contact with the government authorities. Examples include recognition of the clergy and granting permission for venues of religious activities. However, the prerequisite is that the government should protect normal religious activities rather than control them.

6. As for Sino-Vatican relations, the pope clearly expresses his sincere desire to dialogue with Chinese authorities. The ball is now in the hands of the Chinese government to decide whether to express the same sincerity for dialogue. From a practical point of view, if the government continues to use the Chinese Catholic Patriotic Association (CCPA) -- nominally an internal organization of the Church in China but actually a tool the government uses to control the Church -- to lead the China Church, this would clearly indicate that the government is unwilling to have real dialogue. In the long run, if China and the Vatican are to establish diplomatic relations, the CCPA is a card that the government can afford to sacrifice.

7. The papal letter mentions not a single word about bishops and priests still in prison. I personally think this is really an imperfection. We do not call on the pope to give much support to these suffering brothers in his letter since Church history tells us that those who give their lives and blood for their faith in any country subsequently have no important position at the negotiation table. Nor do we want to fight for anything in particular. For the sake of unity and for the good of the Church, we can put that aside and endure in silence. However, the fact that the pope, as pastor of the Universal Church, does not even mention those still suffering in his letter is frustrating and shocking. We would not ask the pope to offend the Chinese government by mentioning it, nor request any special rights. We only want assurance that the Universal Church has not totally abandoned these people who are suffering, in silence. This is just a humble request.

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Cardinal Joseph Zen Ze-kiun of Hong Kong told a press conference July 5 that Pope Benedict XVI's letter to the Catholics in China did not ask the "underground" Church to "surface."

The pope's letter "certainly does not encourage" them to "come out," the prelate said. The underground clergy could make such a move only if the authorities do not attach any conditions, he added.

The decision to surface is a complicated choice, he continued. The cardinal explained that "indeed almost always" in the procedure of recognition, underground clergy are forced to violate Church discipline by joining the Catholic Patriotic Association and concelebrating Mass with the illegitimate bishops ordained without a papal mandate.

Cardinal Zen added that he believes the pope has an open attitude about whether they come out or not.

The press conference at the Catholic Diocese Centre, next to the cathedral, was called to answer the many media inquiries about the June 30 papal letter and the Hong Kong situation.

As the local Church leader called on mainland Catholics to "understand accurately" the pope's letter, he said the Church in Hong Kong, while not mentioned in the letter, will continue to play its role as a bridge Church and help mainland Catholics understand the text.

Concerning Beijing's reaction to the letter, the cardinal said he is glad the initial response is mild, in contrast to the authorities call for mainland bishops to stand against the Holy See during the canonization row in 2000. That year, on Oct. 1, China's National Day, the Vatican canonized 120 Chinese martyrs.

Nevertheless, he thinks the Chinese government is worried about the letter, citing reports that it has warned or closed down some Catholic websites that carried the text or even related news.

By July 6, UCA News found three such websites, run by "underground" Catholics, that still had the full official Chinese text, which ran 19,763 characters including the footnotes. Local public security bureaus closed three other popular sites that carried the papal letter and related news.

One of the key issues addressed in the letter is the appointment of bishops.

On July 5, Wen Wei Po, a pro-Beijing daily in Hong Kong, reported that the dioceses of Guangzhou, Guizhou, Hubei (Yichang) and Ningxia have already elected bishops and are now waiting for the approval of the government-approved bishops' conference. Once this is given, the ordinations will be held within three months, according to Church custom, it quoted an unnamed "authoritative person" as saying.

The person went on to say that the pope in his letter urged "pardon and reconciliation" within the Church. The person also claimed the pope encouraged the underground community to seek recognition by governmental authorities in order to further evangelization work of the China Church.

"Actually, we have been working on pushing forward the underground community to turn 'above ground' to acquire lawful identity. As long as they do not act in violation of laws, they can live normal religious life," the person said.

However, the Chinese daily also quoted the person as saying that Beijing authorities do not accept the "unrealistic" papal letter.

The "authoritative person" summarized that the letter had no surprises for either the open or underground Church communities, had few new things to say and "repeated the hackneyed tune" on fundamental issues.

The pope's letter intentionally avoided the Taiwan issue and did not consider current conditions in China when it addressed the issue of bishops' appointments, the unnamed person was quoted as saying.

Since such an attitude is quite rigid and lacks flexibility, the person continued, it is not likely to have the effect the Vatican might hope for, and might even create more complications and barriers in future dialogue between China and the Vatican.

The person stressed that the Church in China will ordain its bishops according to the actual needs of the local dioceses and will not deliberately speed up or slow down the process.

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In Pope Benedict XVI'S June 30 letter to mainland Catholics giving guidelines for Church life, he also announced the revocation of faculties previously granted to the China Church and pastoral directives concerning it.

The pope revoked "all the faculties previously granted in order to address particular pastoral necessities that emerged in truly difficult times."

He explained that this decision came after "some positive developments" in the China Church situation, "increased opportunities and greater ease in communications" between China and Rome, and "requests sent to Rome by various bishops and priests."


Faculties and special privileges regarding how clergy could administer sacraments under difficult situations were granted to the China Church -- those given in 1978, 1981 and 1988 the most widely known -- as Church activities revived in China following the end of the Cultural Revolution (1966-76).

Anthony Lam Sui-ki, senior researcher of the Hong Kong diocese's Holy Spirit Study Centre, sees the new papal letter as having the potential to help unify the China Church.

When the faculties and special privileges were granted, they were not known throughout the Church on the mainland, Lam told UCA News July 2. When the Holy See suspended them in late 1990s, the same problem recurred, he said.

"This created many controversies, and different Church people have adopted different canonical and ecclesiastical bases to support their respective stances," said Lam.

In his view, a reference to the Code of Canon Law would have made Pope Benedict's letter clearer. He thinks that the phrase "in line with canon law" should be added to the end of the last sentence of section 18, on the revocation of the previous directives: "The doctrinal principles that inspired them now find a new application in the directives contained herein."

Lam is the author of The Catholic Church in Present-Day China Through Darkness and Light, published in 1994, which contains a chapter on the issue.

In his book, Lam noted that when the Church activities revive in late 1970s, not many China bishops were in communion with the pope. When the Vatican's Congregation for the Evangelization of Peoples granted the faculties and special privileges in 1978, this provided a basis for the "underground" Church to develop.

Many of these measures were granted as exceptions to canon law to handle the vacuum created when bishops or diocesan authorities were prevented from carrying out their pastoral duties. One example was allowing clergy to go beyond diocesan boundaries and administer sacraments to Catholics anywhere.

Another exception allowed mainland bishops to ordain Catholic men as priests if they were firm in their faith, virtuous, willing to observe celibacy and loyal to the pope. Formal theological education was not necessary.

In 1981, Bishop Peter Joseph Fan Xueyan of Baoding in Hebei province secretly ordained three priests as bishops. With Holy See's acknowledgement, Bishop Fan and other bishops appointed by Pope Pius XII also privately ordained new bishops. From 1980 to 1993, it is believed that about 80 bishops were ordained secretly.

These so-called underground bishops were not affiliated with government-approved "open" Church organizations. Many of them interpreted Bishop Fan's faculties as applicable to all bishops appointed by Pope Pius XII.

In 1988, the Congregation for the Evangelization of Peoples issued the influential "Eight-Point Directive on Dealings with China," which required that all communicatio in sacris (sacramental communion) be avoided with bishops and priests belonging to the Catholic Patriotic Association (CPA), a government-approved structure to administer the "open" Church in China.

The directive pointed out that the CPA in 1957 issued a proclamation saying the Church "had broken all relationships with the Pope and the Holy See" and announced the Church was to be "under the direct control of the government." It advised mainland Catholics to look for priests in communion with the pope when they attended Mass and received the sacraments.

Such directives have strengthened the growth of the underground Catholic communities. Many of them were still following those directives when Pope Benedict revoked them in his recent letter.

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By Edward Friedman

It’s not easy for American students to know what it means to live without freedom. They know all the bad things about their own country—Virginia Tech, Guantanamo, Abu Ghraib, the Enron and Halliburton scandals, the LA riots, elections stolen, federal attorneys fired for pursuing criminals rather than a political agenda, etc. How democratic is America?, they cynically wonder. When you tell them how awful these other places are, they ask, aren’t you just whitewashing your own society.

The hardest place to understand what the lack of freedom means is China, which is nothing like the Stalin model or Cuba or North Korea. It’s by no stretch of the imagination a totalitarian society. In post-Mao China, Chinese travel abroad in huge numbers. The country has the fifth largest tourist population in the world, on its way to being number one. Hundreds of thousands of Chinese students are abroad; in internet use, China is about to overtake the U.S. as number one in the world. It’s a market society, brutally competitive; the economy is less state-owned than France or Austria’s, for example. Life is not dominated by communist block units; you can buy your own house or car, there’s no forced labor. You can choose your physician freely; most young Chinese would say they live in a free, democratic society.

So what does it mean to say that Chinese people live without freedom? First, it is a brilliant system at making people complicit with the unfreedom. For days after the June 4, 1989, massacre in Beijing of democracy supporters headquartered in Tiananmen Square, there was great tension in the city between people who live there and the occupying army. How did the party respond? Teachers were ordered to teach their students a new song: “The Army loves the people, the people love the Army.” Parents couldn’t say the song was untrue lest their children repeat this back at school. You can’t bring up your children the way you want to.

This is true for many lies the Chinese are forced to let stand uncontested. There still are committees for the defense of the revolution. They have to make their own money and often turn into Avon ladies, visiting house to house, but you know that if you aren’t complicit, maybe you won’t get a passport. It may be held against your child when s/he applies for college. You and your family will be shunned in the neighborhood. You could be committed to a psychiatric hospital.

China is not the worst stable authoritarian regime in the world: a North Korean might consider it free. Even foreigners who go to North Korea and then come back to China feel they are returning to a free country. But you get faced every day with decisions that bring it home to you that you’re not. If your child is ill, should you go to the pharmacy and buy some medicine? Of course, but medicines are often frauds in China. There have been cases where baby formula is bogus and children have died from receiving no nutrition. China has a ruthless free market, no regulation, no safety standards, no FDA, no CDC, no NIH. It’s also the world leader for people dying in industrial accidents, and about 400,000 each year die from drinking the water, which is unpotable. A Chinese journalist recently went to 10 Chinese hospitals wanting to get his blood tested. So he complained of certain aches and pains that he knew would cause them to test his blood. But he didn’t give them his blood, he carried in a thermos with tea and poured that into the cups. Eight of the ten reported to him that he had the most serious blood disease and that it would cost them endless money for treatment.

China has people who see the problems of this corrupt, arbitrary society and try to do something about them. There are courageous lawyers and journalists. The leading political crime in China is land seizures. The economy is growing at a fantastic rate, which means that you can sell pieces of land to a developer for a lot of money. You don’t want ordinary people to get rich. All the goodies are grabbed as much as possible by the ruling group. Over 97 percent of all millionaires in China are relatives of the top party elite. There are those who complain and resist, who stick to their guns. Lawyers come in to defend them. Accordingly, China is first in the world in the number of lawyers, journalists and Netizens in prison.

These things are hard to see when one is visiting, but there are signs one can see if one looks hard. Go to the railroad station at midnight, and you will see tens of thousands of people sleeping in the street. It is probably the most unequal stable society in the world. Income in the poorest rural areas has been declining. There’s no union, with one exception: the government is now promoting getting unions into multinational corporations, but as an instrument of party control, not to help the workers. The Party doesn’t like foreigners doing things they don’t know about. They want their agents in the places where the foreigners are, to control things as much as they can.

Freedom means the ability to hold your government accountable. There is no way to do this in China, and people die. China is said to have 16 of the 20 most polluted cities in the world, and some would say it would be 20 out of 20 if they didn’t lie about the other four. Everything is corrupt. The only way you can get anything done is through corruption. This creates a sense of no morality. But people want meaning in their lives. So there’s a tremendous religious revival. All over China, all religions are reviving. The Party fears it. How does it respond? It crushes Christian house churches, it doesn’t like Lama Buddhism, it’s careful about Hui Muslims, but beyond that, it’s pushing essentially its own state religion, a combination of Han chauvinism, in which Chinese worship the yellow emperor, and an authoritarian Confucianism. The state is building Confucian temples. The vision is that China is going to explain its extraordinary rise to its own people and to the world as the result of its unique ethical religion, its Confucianism. It’s going to spread Confucian societies all around the world, it’s going to teach everybody that China produces a better quality of people because it has this moral authority and all others are inferior. Confucianism is the only way to raise people, and the world is properly hierarchically ordered with Confucian Chinese at the center of it.

China is a superpower. Its economy is rising, its military is rising, and Chinese people in surveys are more popular in most countries of the world than are Americans right now. China’s going to be using this money to serve certain purposes. Among them are undercutting the power of the United States, democracy and human rights and supporting authoritarian regimes. Whether it’s Sudan or Nigeria, they can buy up the oil and governments don’t have to listen to any kind of international pressure about conforming to human rights. China has already defeated the international human rights regime.

China’s rise means that freedom is in trouble. The era we’re in is very much like the era after WWI. Authoritarian models are rising and are becoming more attractive. I can imagine a future in which unregulated hedge funds lead to an international financial crisis and this is seen as coming out of the Anglo-American countries, London and New York being the two centers of these monies. But China regulates capital, so these things are not allowed in. The Chinese model may yet look even more attractive than it does now.

In describing this Chinese rise and how I believe it has the potential of being a threat to freedom in an extraordinary way that we haven’t seen since the end of WWI, I am not trying to suggest that Chinese don’t care about freedom; people do not need a Greek-Roman Christian heritage to care about freedom. That kind of claim is parochially and culturally very narrow. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, with its beautiful preamble, is a Mencian document (Mencius is one of Confucius’ disciples). The word “individual” never appears in the document. The language was shaped by the philosophy of Mencius because one of the crafters of the Universal Declaration was a Chinese gentleman named P.C. Chang. Of course this is December 1948, the day after the Genocide convention was passed. The communists didn’t come to power for another year.

There is no trouble in understanding freedom and human rights in any culture in the world. People living in tyrannies may in fact have a better understanding of what freedom is about than American teens, who think it’s just that you get your driver’s license in your late teens. The Chinese regime has fostered a nationalism to trump democracy. People are taught that they are threatened by democracy, that democracy would make people weak. Party propaganda has it, “How did Rwanda occur? Because they tried to build a democracy. If the Hutus had simply imposed their will, they never would have had that problem. If it moves in a democratic direction, China is going to fall apart; it will be like what happened to Russia, to Yugoslavia. Do you want to end up like Chechnya and Bosnia? That’s what the Americans really want. You are fortunate to be a Chinese living in an ethical, authoritarian system.” The TV will show pictures of say the Los Angeles riots, the Sudan, and people are made frightened and confused. They’re proud to be Chinese and want to raise ethical kids. They want a country they can be proud of, certainly not like American kids. The Chinese are taught that American youth are smoking at an early age, use pot, have babies in their teens, watch pornography on TV, spread AIDS, get divorced, and don’t care what happens to their elderly parents. Why would you want to live in such an immoral way? This propaganda seems to work with many Chinese.

So what is growing in China is an authoritarian, patriotic, racially defined, Confucian Chinese project which is going to be a formidable challenge not just to the United States but, I think, to democracy, freedom, and human rights all around the world. China is going to seem quite attractive to many people. That is why it is so very important to understand what living without freedom really means.

Edward Friedman is professor of political science at the University of Wisconsin-Madison.This essay is based on his presentation at Living Without Freedom: A History Institute for Teachers sponsored by FPRI’s Marvin Wachman Fund for International Education, May 5–6, 2007, held at and co-sponsored by the National Constitution Center and the National Liberty Museum in Philadelphia. FPRI’s History Institute for Teachers program is chaired by David Eisenhower and Walter A. McDougall and receives core support from the Annenberg Foundation; this program was supported by a grant from the Lynde and Harry Bradley Foundation.



This article was orginally published at FPRI

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By Wei Jingsheng

Losing freedom is a painful thing. But exactly how painful it is can vary. For the average child, not being allowed to go outside and play, or for an employee, being forced to work, are losses of freedom. These losses can be painful, and the child or employee might resolve to make trouble for his parents or boss. But by no means does suffering such a loss mean that you can understand what a much more extreme loss of freedom is like. So, reporters and goodhearted people always ask me questions like, “In prison, how were the meals?” or “Were you beaten?” Actually, those problems are much less important. The greatest and most serious problem is losing your freedom. That is the severe pain.

During my 18 years in prison, I was kept in strictly solitary confinement for three years. The rest of the time, although I was held alone in a cell, it was not as strict; I could chat with guards and fellow prisoners. During the three years of solitary confinement, there was a period of more than a year when I was not let out of my tiny cell even once. No one was allowed to speak with me; the door was always closed. Food was delivered through a small opening in the lower part of the iron cell door. Outside my window there was a small yard, but even that no one was allowed to enter. In this environment of complete isolation from the outside world, a person begins to slowly lose his endurance. An indescribable feeling of torment comes forth from within. Many people in this sort of situation lose their sense of reason; more serious cases go insane, becoming mentally ill. Many political prisoners are driven mad this way, including those imprisoned as a result of political fights within the Chinese Communist Party.

During that time of confinement, many would pay no attention to the quality of the food or to being beaten. Many prisoners would even welcome a beating, the pain of which would be cathartic, because the suffering in one’s heart would vent forth, giving one a feeling of being liberated. During that time, I would intentionally kick the door with my foot, yell and shout to draw the person guarding me to come quarrel and fight. I would seize the chance to vent the rising gloom trapped in my heart. Unfortunately this method only worked once. At the time the feeling of release exceeded my expectations. I felt relaxed and carefree for several days. But the second time it didn’t work, they discovered my plot. No matter how hard I kicked the door or how much I yelled, they paid no attention to me. Later a kindly guard told me there were orders from above that no matter what commotion I made they were to pay it no heed, so I need not bother.

I then thought of a new plan. I had with me a few Russian middle-school textbooks. Every day I would read them out in a very loud voice. The entire prison could hear me. Actually I was only venting, I was not reading Russian at all. Many years later I encountered a convict who was in the same prison at the time, who told me: “It would be useful if your English were as good as your Russian.” I asked, “How do you know my Russian is good?” He responded, “Back then I heard you read Russian in a loud voice. I never understood why you didn’t study English, but were studying Russian.” I did not know how I should respond, because, actually, I was not even studying Russian. The other convict had lived in a larger cell and had just a little bit more freedom than we did, and so he could not understand the suffering of those with less freedom.

A long time passed. One day a guard suddenly called me to go out and play badminton. At first, I didn’t know what was up. After playing for a while, I didn’t feel anything unusual, we just played very happily all afternoon. That was much better than fighting with the guard. After a few days I asked a guard when I could play badminton. The guard said, “Play badminton, what, are you dreaming?” For more than ten years, I never understood why they only let me play badminton once. After being released there was a reporter who asked me: “The treatment in prison was not too bad, was it? We all saw the tape of you playing badminton.” Only then did I realize why I had played badminton only once. It was to make a videotape to deceive the international community. Once it was recorded, it was over; wanting to play badminton again was of course like the guard said, dreaming.

After this sort of experience, I feel even more keenly that freedom is the most important condition for a person’s existence. Indeed, I think that for the last few thousand years human society has been searching for a better social system. What is a better social system? A system that can more effectively guarantees everyone’s freedom. With the prerequisite of upholding social order, a social system that can provide a greater guarantee of freedom is a better system.

Autocratic systems probably have greater social order than some democratic societies, but the prerequisite for that social order is a large sacrifice in personal freedom. People in that sort of system lose too much freedom and severely lack the necessary conditions for living. When enough people’s lives become too hard to bear, they will eventually resist and revolt.

Social order seemed very good in China during Mao Zedong’s time; the average people seemed to behave themselves, and prostitution and drugs were nearly eliminated. Some confused Western scholars thought Mao Zedong had created a society that conformed most closely to their standards of an ideal social system. But they were mistaken. Just as they were coming to believe that Mao had created an ideal society, the Cultural Revolution started in 1966. After more than a decade, the Communist Party’s autocratic rule had finally deprived the Chinese people of too much freedom. The spirit in society to resist and revolt had grown.

When people live in a free society, they can undervalue the importance of freedom. They mistakenly believe that even without freedom, the Chinese people can live very well. When the Chinese people rise up to oppose the CCP, those who themselves are free cannot understand why people have to destroy a good social order. Foreigners could not comprehend why we had to have the Cultural Revolution.

According to normal understanding, cultural change is a slow process. What effect can that sort of violent storm of a revolution have on cultural change? Mao called for revolt, and many ordinary people took the opportunity to oppose the Communist Party officials. In this sense it was not really a “cultural” revolution. One aspect was Mao using the “Cultural Revolution” that all in the Communist Party could agree with as a pretext for inciting a movement to strike down his political opponents. Another aspect was ordinary people seizing the opportunity to vent the dissatisfaction and unhappiness that had built up in their hearts for many years. However, at the end, the Cultural Revolution took the “dictatorship of the proletariat” to the extreme and suppressed the movement that Mao had launched.

On these two points, Deng Xiaoping and later Chinese Communist leaders have something in common. They have feared that the people will revolt and also that the people will say they are the dictatorship of the proletariat. So they have not allowed people to talk about the problem of the Cultural Revolution. One of the greatest lessons from the revolts during the Cultural Revolution was that everyone believed that he would gain legitimacy by rebelling under the banner of Mao. In the end, rebelling under the banner of Mao was like rebelling while kneeling before the emperor. When the emperor wants to put you back in your place, you have no way out.

The CCP especially feared that after the people absorbed this experience, the next time their rebellion would not be under the Party’s banner. So they did not permit the people to study the lessons from this experience and discuss the Cultural Revolution.

Under the CCP’s autocratic rule, the people cannot participate in forming public opinion. With no freedom of speech, the so-called “four great freedoms”—to “speak freely,” to “air your views freely,” to write “big character posters,” and to engage in “big debates”—were just to leave ordinary people with just a last little bit of the people’s freedom.[1] Of course, they could speak nonsense, just as America’s freedom also allows people to speak nonsense.

The main reason Deng eliminated the “four great freedoms” after the Cultural Revolution was that Democracy Wall[2] evidenced that people were using those freedoms to criticize the government, which caused fear among the leadership. So Deng used the Cultural Revolution as an argument to intimidate and persuade those within the party to support him in eliminating Democracy Wall. “The four great freedoms” of the Cultural Revolution and Democracy Wall period vividly showed Deng the power of freedom of speech. Deng Xiaoping used Democracy Wall’s momentum to defeat Hua Guofeng’s “Whatever” Faction.[3] The power of the people had shown that it could interfere with power struggles in the central authorities, and that it was quite formidable in its own right. So, the first thing Deng did after he took power was to shut down Democracy Wall. Such was the lesson the new leaders had learned from the experience of the Cultural Revolution and Democracy Wall: be very afraid of ordinary people seizing the opportunity to rebel. So after they assimilated their experiences from the Cultural Revolution and Democracy Wall, the CCP leaders became very afraid of the people taking opportunities to rebel.

Deng Xiaoping sensed that for him to continue to rule, although he could wave the banner of democracy, by no means did he need democracy. He saw very clearly that he still needed to use the method of the dictatorship of the proletariat to handle the Chinese people. He did not want people to criticize the dictatorship of the proletariat. The major portion of the brutality of the Cultural Revolution was caused by the dictatorship of the proletariat; rather than by struggles among the people. Struggles between two factions were in fact caused by Mao Zedong and his gang sowing discord. This was precisely one of Mao’s methods of playing with the dictatorship of the proletariat.

CCP intra-party struggles, as a rule, are ruthless. The Communist Party’s type of despotic, autocratic politics, which also has certain characteristics of a religion, is fanatical and impervious to reason. So it manifests itself as even more cruel than autocratic rule of ancient times. Under such ruthless conditions, leaders become especially unable to acknowledge their mistakes, and the mindset of revenge becomes especially strong. I have heard that now it is also like this; there has been little change since the Cultural Revolution: “No matter what tactic I use, I have to cut you down, otherwise you will probably cut me down, and it would probably be a pretty nasty end.” This type of situation brings about ruthless politics.

Here, I wish to speak about religion, but not the modern West’s religion, which is separated from politics; rather, I refer to the religion of the Middle Ages with its unification of church and state. Much of the activity during the Cultural Revolution was similar to religious rituals. Every day one had to listen, read, ask for instructions in the morning, report back in the evening—in ritual forms resembling prayer. Bare your heart to the party, bare your heart to the leaders—this imitates confession.

This way of doing things was in part an idea of Mao’s, in part it probably also is related to the May Fourth era[4] idea of complete Westernization. At the time people summed up what they learned from the Westernization movement and from the failure of the Hundred Days Reform.[5] They believed China’s culture was inadequate and prevented China from adopting advanced Western things. So the first step was to destroy Chinese culture. Then it would be easier to paint a good picture on a blank piece of paper. This was the ideology of the far left during the May Fourth movement. It later became the ideology of the CCP.

In truth, many of the methods of the Cultural Revolution were anticipated in the May Fourth period. They developed to reach extremes during the Cultural Revolution. Wanting to destroy all traditional Chinese culture, and wanting to destroy all Western culture that was not beneficial to the construction of communist autocracy—this makes China a cultural desert.

Having been through the Cultural Revolution and Democracy Wall, Deng saw that using communism’s ideals to rule people’s minds had failed. Then, what thing is most easy to do to soften people’s thinking, cause them not to rebel? That is what Marx had talked about as the opium of the spirit. So he used other extreme means—“looking toward money” and the desire for material things; prostitution, drugs, and other such things—to numb people’s will to resist and eliminate their power to rebel. In order to maintain the one-party dictatorship, the rulers don’t really give the people freedom and democracy.

Some Western entrepreneurs and scholars are now making the mistake of believing that the same freedom exists in America and in China. Their perception is correct, because in China they are treated as privileged friends of the Communist Party, and naturally they enjoy the same freedom as the Party.

But they have not noticed, or they have intentionally overlooked, that the freedom—greater than the freedom in America—enjoyed by them and the special privileged class of the CCP has been based upon sacrificing the freedom of the vast majority of Chinese. The majority that has been sacrificed of course is sure to resist this sort of oppression, create instability, and revolt. Yet the Communist Party wants to maintain its autocratic institutions, and of course it must be hostile toward democratic countries that are more in line with human existence. This [the hostile relationship and struggle between autocracy and autocrats, on one hand, and realization of freedom and the needs of human existence, on the other] is the basic structure of modern international relations. This also has been the basic structure of all the basic changes that have occurred in social institutions over the last several thousand years.

There are some American politicians who say, “We can set aside ideological differences to develop amicable international relations.” I believe that their intentions are good, but the Communist Party does not believe so. The CCP believes that America’s existence is a threat. Because the freedom that democracy guarantees is too appealing, every day that democratic institutions exist testifies to the failure of despotism. Every day those institutions provide an example for overturning autocracies. How, then, can the CCP trust that what America says is the truth? Why does America regularly make mistakes when dealing with China? It is because many Americans do not understand that lack of freedom is the fundamental reason that will compel Chinese people to revolt.

Enjoying freedom is the natural desire of human beings, thus the fundamental differences between democratic systems that guarantee freedom and autocratic systems that strangle freedom. This is the root cause of the ideological conflict, an issue that cannot be avoided or ignored.

Notes
A legacy of the Cultural Revolution, the “four great freedoms” were included in the Chinese Constitution adopted in 1978 as officially valued and validated methods of popular political participation. “Big character posters”—literally meaning (though not always in practice) posters that used large writing in Chinese characters to set forth political attacks and manifestos—were a favored tool of Cultural Revolutionaries, including Mao himself in the movement’s initial phase. (Ed.) [back]
Democracy Wall (1978-79) refers to the group of Beijing-based writers—among whom Wei became the most prominent—and their writings, which were critical of the regime and advocated democratic reform. The name derives from a brick wall at Xidan in central Beijing where many of these writings were posted and near which impromptu journals from the movement distributed. (Ed.)

Hua Guofeng was Mao’s designated, short-lived successor. Hua’s opponents (who included Deng) branded Hua and his allies as the “Whatever Faction,” claiming that they believed in following “whatever” Mao had said or done (rather than the reformist policies that Deng and his “practice” faction allies favored, which they claimed to be based on the principle of “practice is the sole criterion of truth.”).

The May Fourth era refers to the period early in the twentieth century when Chinese intellectuals, including those who would be among the founders of the Chinese Communist Party, articulated the principles of modern Chinese nationalism and called for major political and cultural changes. The name comes from the events of May 4, 1919, the date of student protests (followed by additional demonstrations, strikes and a boycott of Japanese goods) in response to provisions in the Versailles peace accords that accorded Japan former German concessions in China and thereby inflamed Chinese nationalist sentiments.

The Hundred Days Reform refers to a short-lived and unsuccessful effort in 1898 to salvage the Qing dynasty’s crumbling rule by undertaking political, social and educational reforms, including principally those advocated by Kang Youwei.

Wei Jingsheng is a leading activist and advocate for human rights and democracy in China and critic of the Chinese Communist Party’s rule. He was imprisoned twice for a total of more than 18 years for his activities, including his 1978 essay, “The Fifth Modernization.” He is the author of Courage to Stand Alone: Letters from Prison and Other Writings, which compiles essays written initially on toilet paper in jail. He is the founder of the Overseas Chinese Democracy Coalition and co-founder of Asia Democracy Alliance. This essay (with editorial notes by Jacques deLisle chair of FPRI’s Asia Program) is based on his presentation at Living Without Freedom, a History Institute for Teachers sponsored by FPRI’s Marvin Wachman Fund for International Education, May 5-6, 2007, held at and co-sponsored by the National Constitution Center and the National Liberty Museum in Philadelphia. FPRI’s History Institute program is chaired by David Eisenhower and Walter A. McDougall and receives core support from the Annenberg Foundation. The program on Living without Freedom was supported by a grant from the Lynde and Harry Bradley Foundation. For video, a conference report, and the other speakers’ essays, see www.fpri.org/education/livingwithoutfreedom.

Originally published at FPRI
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The underground bishop of Zhengding, freed eight days ago after 17 in a jail, is both hopeful and pessimistic about what the Pope’s letter to Chinese Catholics might do. The prelate, who has spent more than 20 years in a labour camp, believes that the Chinese government has not changed. “It uses the same strategy as during Mao’s times” and relies on the Patriotic Association to split the Church. But for the Church itself the Pope’s letter is an important sign of what direction to follow.

Mgr Julius Jia Zhiguo, a 73-year-old who spent more than 20 years in prison, is the underground bishop of Zhengding (Hebei), the Chinese province where anti-Catholic persecution is strongest. He lives in isolation and is constantly detained by the police for political (brainwashing) sessions designed to force him to submit to the Patriotic Association, the government agency whose ultimate goals is to set up a Church independent of the Holy See. The last time Mgr Jia was seized was June 5 but was let go on June 22. Overcoming his isolation, AsiaNews was able to ask him some questions about the Pope’s letter which he was actually reading when he was contacted.

Your Excellency, what influence will the Pope’s letter have on Church-state relations?

I fear we should not expect too much from it. China’s politicians have not changed at all. The government uses the same strategy as during Mao’s times and just instigates and creates conflicts within the Church.

This has been going on for 50 years (since the creation of the Patriotic Association or PA) and I am afraid that the Pope’s letter won’t change much to the situation.

Of course the letter clearly states what the Church’s teachings are and for those who seek the truth it is greatly encouraging. But for the many atheists among the politicians this does not mean anything. They won’t change their ideas because of any statement. What is necessary is for the government to make a profound change in mentality and allow for greater openness and religious freedom.

What do you think about the relationship between the Church and the Patriotic Association after the Pope condemned it in his letter?

The Patriotic Association is a tool in the government’s hands. Its interference won’t stop until the government says so. The problem is that the PA cannot decide for itself. It is not independent but is at the service of the government, under its control. It is not easy to break those chains. I think that without the Lord’s intervention the situation cannot improve. We don’t believe that the Lord always works within His Church.

Will the letter improve relations between the official and underground Church?

For those who live in truth and justice and are faithful to their faith, this letter will be the right push towards unity. The real problem is how to overcome the pressures that come from the state. Various official bishops are afraid to actively communicate with underground bishops. Courage is often found wanting because they too are under strict control. Their phones are always tapped by the government for example. Even if they are government-approved, there is not much they can do—they can’t do what they want.

But for us underground bishops, who are not recognised by the government, communications are a problem. It is almost impossible to do it directly. I live under constant controls. But for them controls are event greater. We might get in touch indirectly, through intermediaries. But we know that no one “wants to create difficulties” for the government.

The Pope’s letter urges Catholics to live the mission in China with courage . . . ?

I have not yet finished reading the letter, but I think for the more resolute Catholics, it offers a clear-cut path. On this issue, Benedict XVI’s teachings are aligned with those of John Paul II. We shall have to carry out our ministry and mission from within the communion. With the Lord’s encouragement and the Pope’s guidance, I shall continue my mission without fear. The journey we have undertaken so far is the right one. And we shall continue. The Pope’s support helps us go as far as we have to, even if it might mean sacrificing our lives.

Source: Asia News

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HONG KONG (UCAN) -- Bishops of the "open" Church in China have been called to a two-day meeting in Beijing.

Some bishops whom UCA News contacted said they believe the June 28-29 meeting is related to an expected letter of Pope Benedict XVI to Catholics in mainland China, others said they do not know why the meeting was called.

The pope promised to write such a pastoral letter after a summit took place Jan. 19-20 at the Vatican to discuss the Catholic Church situation in China. The letter, which Pope Benedict reportedly signed on Pentecost Sunday, May 27, is generally expected to be released soon.

Anthony Liu Bainian, a Chinese Catholic Patriotic Association (CCPA) vice chairman, confirmed to UCA News on June 27 that the bishops have been invited to a June 28-29 meeting to discuss a plan for the celebration of the CCPA's golden jubilee. At the same time, he denied that the meeting has any connection with the papal letter. "We don't know its content, so how can we discuss it?" Liu said.

The first CCPA meeting opened in Beijing on July 15, 1957. After 18 days, the participants formally established the CCPA, approved its statutes and agreed Archbishop Ignatius Pi Shushi of Shenyang would be the first chairman.

Bishop Johan Fang Xingyao of Linyi, Shandong province, who reached Beijing June 27, told UCA News the meeting organized by the CCPA and the Bishops' Conference of the Catholic Church in China (BCCCC) will mark the 10th anniversary of the death of Bishop Joseph Zong Huaide, former head of CCPA and BCCCC. He died on June 27, 1997.

Bishop Fang, a BCCCC vice president, said that he knows of no other agenda for the meeting and that about seven to eight bishops have already arrived.

A Church source in Beijing told UCA News that a few bishops and a dozen priests from Shandong and other provinces attended the commemoration held June 27 morning for Shandong-born Bishop Zong.

The Church source believed that the June 28-29 meeting might also discuss the pope's pastoral letter, but the agenda remains unknown. Basically all bishops must attend, the source pointed out, and most were informed by phone, but some were told about the meeting by local religious affairs officials.

A bishop in northern China told UCA News that local religious affairs officials had informed him about the meeting on June 25 and he was just then on his way to Beijing. He also said he was told the meeting will be about "how to receive the papal letter."

Another bishop in central China who asked not to be named told UCA News that he and other bishops in his province heard about "a meeting in Beijing June 28-29," but not about its agenda. He said he is still pondering whether or not he will attend.

A bishop in southern China also about to go to the airport told UCA News on June 27 that he does not know the purpose of the meeting, but he and a fellow bishop guess it is somehow related to the forthcoming papal letter.

That same day, Bishop John Liu Jingshan of Ningxia told UCA News he was told about the meeting but cannot go due to a leg problem. He added that his guess is the meeting is related to the forthcoming papal letter.


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